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Abstract
Public goods are often either over-consumed in the absence of regulatory mechanisms, resulting in
a reduction in their value to customers, or remain completely unused, as in the case of the Covid-19
pandemic, where strict social distance constraints are enforced to either prevent or limit the number
of people who can share public spaces. In this work, we look to plug this gap through market based
mechanisms designed to efficiently allocate capacity constrained public goods. To design these mecha-
nisms, we leverage the theory of Fisher markets, wherein each agent in the economy is endowed with
an artificial currency budget that they can spend to avail the public goods. While Fisher markets pro-
vide a strong methodological backbone to model public goods allocation problems, their applicability is
limited to settings involving just two types of constraints - budgets of individual buyers and capacities
of goods. The presence of additional physical constraints that arise in public goods allocation problems
motivates the need for modifications to the Fisher market framework to account for these more general
set of constraints.
In our market mechanism, we specifically modify the Fisher market social optimization problem
through a perturbation of the budgets of the agents. The budget perturbations are set based on the
dual variables of the additional physical constraints such that the KKT conditions of the newly defined
Fisher market social and individual optimization problems are equivalent. While the perturbed social
optimization problem may not have any resemblance of the original societal objective, we show that the
optimal allocation corresponding to this perturbed problem is closely related to the optimal allocation of
the unperturbed social optimization problem. Finally, to compute the budget perturbation constants we
present a fixed point iterative procedure, establish the convergence of this fixed point scheme and present
numerical experiments that corroborate our convergence guarantees. Thus, our proposed mechanism,
both theoretically and computationally, overcomes a fundamental limitation of Fisher markets, which
only consider capacity and budget constraints.
1 Introduction
A public good is a product that an individual can consume without reducing its availability to others and
of which no one is deprived. These properties are the defining features of pure public goods, examples
of which include law enforcement, national defense, sewer systems, public parks, and the air we breathe.
In reality, almost no good can satisfy the precise definitions of both non-rivalry and non-excludability [1],
as these goods often suffer from over consumption [2], which leads to a decreased utility for consumers.
This phenomena becomes more so during the Covid-19 pandemic, where the social distance constraints
are enforced so that only a limited number of people can share public spaces [3]. One consequence of
the social distancing constraint is that it results in completely closing parks or beaches [4], which leads to
goods becoming non-public. Thus, on one hand public goods may no longer satisfy the non-rivalry and
non-excludability properties associated with these resources while on the other hand the lack of regulation
of public goods results in the consumers behaving in their own selfish interests when using these goods,
which leads to the overuse of such shared resources, i.e. tragedy of the commons. For instance, public
spaces such as beaches are often overcrowded; however, during times such as the Covid-19 pandemic beaches
remain completely unused, thereby generating no value to society. In particular, Figure 1 illustrates these
two contrasting outcomes that we are faced with in society today and highlights the need for a regulatory
mechanism that imposes restrictions on the usage of these shared resources.
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Figure 1: The current scenario involving either an overcrowded beach (left) or a completely unused beach (right)
generating no value to society.
In this paper, we attempt to achieve an intermediate between these currently opposing and undesirable
outcomes through market based mechanisms to efficiently allocate shared resources. To achieve such a
balance, we study capacity constrained public resources, which helps prevent the overcrowding concerns
associated with public goods and is in line with situations when strict capacity constraints in the use of
public spaces are necessitated, such as in the case of Covid-19. In our work, we leverage the presence of
alternatives in the case of many public goods, which enables us to distribute the consumer load over resources
to achieve a more favourable outcome for society as a whole. Examples of public good alternatives include
myriad local grocery stores and restaurants as well as the multiple options for recreational use such as parks
and beaches. As demand often outweighs the supply of public goods, we need to make decisions on who gets
the preference to use certain public spaces in the presence of capacity constraints. These allocation decisions
are facilitated through a pricing mechanism that ensures the formation of a market equilibrium, i.e., each
agent purchases their most preferred bundle of goods that is affordable under the set prices. The pricing
decisions must be made with fairness considerations in mind, as public goods are by design available to all
individuals such that no person can be deprived of them. We ensure the fairness of resulting allocations of
our market based mechanism through two methods. First, we endow each agent in the economy with an
artificial currency budget and charge customers this artificial currency for the use of public spaces. The non-
monetary transfers ensure that public goods allocation decisions are not biased towards those with higher
income levels. Second, when making pricing and subsequent allocation decisions we simultaneously take into
account individual consumer preferences, i.e., each agent’s utilities for the use of different public goods, while
ensuring that the allocation decisions are beneficial for society.
To study our resource allocation problem under capacity constraints while considering both individual
agent preferences and societal benefit, we resort to one of the canonical models used in this context, that
of Fisher markets. In a Fisher market framework, consumers spend their budget of money (or artificial
currency) to buy goods that maximize their individual utility functions, while producers sell their capacity
constrained goods in exchange for currency. A key property of interest with Fisher markets is the formation
of a Fisher equilibrium when the market clears, i.e. all the budgets are spent and all the goods are sold. At
this market equilibrium, the buyers get their most preferred bundle of goods under the prices that are set,
while a social objective is maximized.
We first describe each agent’s individual optimization problem in the Fisher market setup. Each agent
wishes to purchase their most favoured bundle of goods and thus the decision variable for an agent i is
the quantity of each of the goods j that they wish to purchase and is represented by xij . We denote the
allocation vector for each agent i as xi ∈ Rm, when there are m goods in the market. A key assumption with
the Fisher market framework is that goods are divisible and so fractional allocations are possible. In the
context of public goods allocation problems, we interpret these fractional allocations xij as the probability
that agent i is allocated to good j. Finally, denoting wi as the budget of agent i, ui(xi) as the utility of
agent i as a function of their allocation and p ∈ Rm as the vector of prices for the goods, individual decision
making in Fisher markets can be modelled as the following optimization problem:
max
xi ∈ Rm
ui(xi) (1a)
s.t. pTxi ≤ wi (1b)
xi ≥ 0 (1c)
Here agent i has a budget constraint (1b) and a non-negativity constraint (1c) on the allocations.
The vector of prices p ∈ Rm that each agent observes are computed through the solution of a social
optimization problem that aggregates the utilities of all agents in the economy. The social objective function
used in the Fisher market literature is one wherein the optimal allocation maximizes the budget weighted
geometric mean of the buyer’s utilities. The choice of the social objective is such that under certain conditions
on the utility function, the KKT conditions of the social optimization problem and the above individual
optimization problem can be shown to be equivalent. The prices in the market are then computed as the
dual variables of the capacity constraint (2b) in the following social optimization problem:
max
xi ∈ Rm,∀i ∈ [n]
u(x1, ...,xn) =
∑
i
wi log(ui(xi)) (2a)
s.t.
∑
i
xij = s¯j ,∀j ∈ [m] (2b)
xij ≥ 0,∀i, j (2c)
where there are n agents in the economy and m shared resources, with each resource j having a strict capacity
constraint of s¯j ≥ 0 and a price pj . We further denote [a] as the set {1, 2, ..., a}.
The equivalence of the KKT conditions of the social and individual optimization problems establishes
that under the prices set through the solution of the social optimization problem each agent has their most
favourable bundle of goods [5]. Furthermore, when the utility function has regularity such as in the case
of the commonly used linear and leontief utilities, the market clearing prices in a Fisher market can be
computed in polynomial time.
While these appealing properties of Fisher markets have been leveraged with great success in a range of
applications including online advertising [6] as well as in revenue optimization [7], there is a fundamental
limitation with the Fisher market framework that limits its practical use in public goods allocation problems.
This limitation stems from the consideration of only two types of constraints - budgets of buyers and
capacities of goods - in the Fisher market model. In many public goods allocation problems, the availability of
substitutes imposes additional physical constraints that are necessary to consider for the resulting allocation
to be meaningful. To model the availability of public good alternatives, we pool together public goods serving
similar functionality into their own resource types. For instance, if we had multiple grocery stores and parks
in a neighborhood, we could pool them into two different resource types. Such examples of resource types
are described in table 1 and we delve into further detail on the constraints associated with these resource
types in section 1.4, where we elucidate the real world applications of this work.
Resource Type Context
Type of Public Space Multiple Grocery stores in a neighborhood
Time of Day for Use of Public Space A Beach selling time of use permits
Table 1: Examples of resource types in public goods allocation problems
The presence of these additional constraints raises the question of whether we can still find appropriate
market clearing prices while retaining the desirable properties of the Fisher market framework. This question
leads us to the main focus of this paper, which is to:
Design a market based mechanism that achieves the same properties as the Fisher market framework while
also supporting additional physical constraints.
1.1 Modelling Framework
In our pursuit of such a mechanism, we start by defining each agent’s individual optimization problem with
the addition of these physical constraints. As in the fisher market framework, we model agents as utility
maximizers and in this work, each agent’s utility function is assumed to be linear in the allocations, which
is a common utility function used in the Fisher market literature [8, 9]. We model the preference of an
agent i for one unit of good j through the utility uij . While consumers will derive different utilities from the
different resources, they will have a constraint on the quantity of goods that they are willing to avail in any
given resource type. To model this physical constraint we denote the set of all resource types as T , and each
public good j belongs to exactly one resource type. We further let Ti ⊆ T denote the resource types that
each agent i is interested in consuming and for the ease of exposition we normalize each agent’s constraints
such that each agent would like to obtain at most one unit of goods in each resource type. These physical
constraints are specified by a matrix A. Using our earlier defined notation to specify the budgets and the
prices, we have the following individual optimization problem (IOP):
max
xi
ui(xi) =
∑
j
uijxij (3a)
s.t. pTxi ≤ wi (3b)
ATt xi ≤ 1,∀t ∈ Ti (3c)
xi ≥ 0 (3d)
We note that as one of our primary goals is to establish market clearing outcomes of our mechanism, we need
to assume that the physical constraints are not degenerate such that they will prevent a market clearing
outcome from being feasible. For instance, if we have a situation when no individual would like to use public
goods belonging to a specific resource type then the capacity of that specific resource would be completely
unused. However, in this case, we can neglect those resource types from our analysis, as we are primarily
concerned with public resources for which the demand is greater than supply. Analogously, we might end
up in situations when an agent’s budget is unused. Even in this case, our assumption on restricting the
constraints is reasonable since, even when the physical constraints are hard, each agent can always keep
unused budget for use in the future. As a result, we can treat budget as a good, which has been considered
and analyzed in [10].
We further assume that individual preferences over goods are not uniform across all agents. While this
assumption is not necessary for establishing the market clearing property of our mechanism in section 3,
it aids our analysis in section 4. We note that the assumption that there is some variation in the utilities
that people derive from different goods even within the same resource types is without loss of generality, as
if there were little or no variation in individual preferences, an optimal allocation would be to assign each
person an equal fraction of each good.
1.2 Our Contributions
We consider the design of a pricing scheme through a market based mechanism when each agent’s individual
optimization problem is of the form (3a)-(3d), i.e., there are additional physical constraints not accounted for
in the Fisher market framework. With the addition of these constraints, we first show that market clearing
conditions fail to hold under a natural extension of Fisher markets, wherein we add physical constraints (3c) to
the social optimization problem (2a)-(2c) and derive prices using this constraint augmented problem (denoted
as SOP1). This negative result points out that certain modifications are necessary to the traditional Fisher
market framework to have any hope of guaranteeing the existence of market equilibria, while retaining many
of the desirable properties of Fisher markets elucidated earlier.
In this work, we show that indeed such a modification to Fisher markets exists through the formulation
of a new social optimization problem. Our approach is to perturb the budgets of the agents by constants
that depend on the dual variables of the additional physical constraints (3c). We then show the following
properties of this budget perturbed social optimization problem (denoted as BP-SOP):
• Market Clearing: We choose the budget perturbation constants such that the budgets of the agents
exactly equal the amount of currency they spend in the market. With this choice of the perturbations,
we show that the KKT conditions of this reformulated social optimization problem are the same as
that of the individual optimization problem. This establishes that the prices corresponding to the dual
variables of the social optimization problem (BP-SOP) will clear the market.
• Solution Applicability: We further show that the solution to the perturbed version of the social
optimization problem (BP-SOP) is closely related to the solution of the natural social optimization
problem (SOP1) in the sense that it maintains the utilities of the agents. More specifically, we establish
that the utilities of the agents are invariant to the value of the budget perturbation, which shows that
the solution to BP-SOP accurately reflects the original societal objective. This also indicates that the
role of the budget perturbation constants is to establish the market clearing property of our mechanism
and does not impact the resulting allocations in any other significant way.
• Computational Feasibility: The perturbation term that we add in our objective function of the
social optimization problem depends on one of its dual variables, which we do not have knowledge of
apriori. To determine the true value of the perturbation constants we present a fixed point iteration
scheme and establish the convergence of this procedure to a unique fixed point. This establishes
the feasibility of our procedure in determining the true perturbation parameters, which enables our
mechanism to be implementable in real world applications. We also present numerical experiments to
corroborate the convergence guarantees and show numerically that convergence of our iterative scheme
does not require any structure on the budgets and utilities of the agents, i.e., convergence is invariant
to perturbations in the data (i.e. the budgets and the utilities of consumers).
1.3 Related Work
Setting appropriate market clearing prices has been a prominent topic of research at the intersection of
economic and optimization theory.
1.3.1 Combinatorial Assignment
Our setting is closely related to that studied by Budish [11] who developed a market based mechanism to
assign students to courses. In Budish’s framework, courses have strict capacity constraints and students are
endowed with budgets and must submit their preferences to a centralized mechanism that provides approxi-
mately market efficient allocations provided that budgets of students are not all exactly equal. Furthermore,
the allocation that is provided respects student’s schedule constraints, analogous to the physical constraints
that are not accounted for in the Fisher market framework. In addition to deriving the existence of an ap-
proximate market equilibrium, Budish also provides approximate truthfulness guarantees of his mechanism.
We study the problem of allocating public goods under general constraints from a different perspective
than that considered by Budish. In particular, we approach the public goods allocation problem from the
standpoint of setting appropriate prices that guarantee a market clearing outcome, which simultaneously
maximizes societal welfare whilst also maximizing individual utilities subject to those prices.
1.3.2 Efficient Allocation of Public Goods
One of the most prominent market mechanisms developed for the allocation of public goods was introduced
by Lindahl, in which personalized prices were used to obtain a Pareto efficient outcome. However, the use
of pricing devices, such as marginal benefit taxation [12], in which each person pays taxes in proportion to
their own cost share do not guarantee that consumers will reveal their preferences truthfully. As a result,
institutional devices have long been thought of as the holy grail to allocate shared resources such as public
goods primarily due to the free-rider problem, which deemed free market mechanisms as inferior. Thus, a
major focus of the work on the efficient allocation of public goods has been to truthfully elicit consumer
preferences to solve the free-rider problem. For instance [13] develops a class of mechanisms by introducing
the government, which according to certain rules decides the level of public goods to be offered and the
payments that need to be made from the agents in the form of taxes in the Arrow-Debreu model of the
economy. A different approach was used by [14] through the assignment of cost responsibilities, i.e. a set of
assigned marginal price schedules, to elicit truthful preference revelations from consumers.
1.3.3 Existence of Fisher Market Equilibria
A key property of fisher market mechanisms entails the existence of market clearing equilibria. Eisenberg and
Gale’s seminal work [15, 16] formulate Fisher’s original problem with linear utilities as a convex optimization
linear programming problem that can be solved in polynomial time. Extending this work to more complex
utility functions, Chen et al. [10] established the existence of Fisher market equilibria for a range of utility
functions and specified the conditions under which the market equilibrium can be computed in polynomial
time. However, we also note that there are many instances when Fisher market equilibria cannot be computed
in polynomial time and a significant body of literature has focused on establishing the hardness of computing
such equilibria.
1.3.4 Fairness with Artificial Currencies
Since public resources are designed to be available to all individuals such that no one can be deprived of
them, when employing market based mechanisms one must take the fairness of the resulting allocation into
account. A popular method to achieve an equal playing ground for all agents in a mechanism has been the
use of artificial currencies. For instance, Gorokh et al., established how artificial currencies can be equally
distributed to agents to achieve fairness and people can then use this equal budget when taking part in
the mechanism [17]. Furthermore, Budish also endowed students with an artificial currency budget, which
was approximately equal and established certain approximate fairness properties of his mechanism relating
to envy-freeness and max-min fairness [11]. We follow a similar idea in our work by endowing agents with
artificial currency budgets that they can spend, which helps overcome concerns of priced mechanisms, e.g.,
congestion pricing, in regulating the use of public resources.
1.4 Specific Applications and Implementation
In this section, we explore real world applications of our mechanism to efficiently allocate public goods and
demonstrate how such a mechanism could be implemented for the purposes of allocating time of use permits
for a public space, such as a beach.
1.4.1 Allocating People to Public Spaces with Substitutable Options
The Covid-19 pandemic has necessitated the restricted use of public spaces, with people required to follow
strict social distancing practices. To tackle this issue, the solution employed by public spaces, such as grocery
stores, is to impose capacity constraints on the use of these spaces based on a priority queuing policy wherein
the priority is based on the arrival time of the customers. However, as there is no mechanism to better inform
customers about the right arrival times at the public spaces, this has resulted in long waiting lines. This can
further increase the risk of exposure to Covid-19 despite people maintaining a distance of six feet from each
other when waiting in the lines. While these long waiting lines may be the case for the more well known
stores, there are often other stores that are visited by only a few people, which leads to a major imbalance
in the load placed on these different shared resources. As a result, we consider our market based mechanism
as a method to more efficiently allocate such shared public spaces to customers.
To align with the notation defined earlier, we consider an ordered list of public spaces in a city S, where
|S| = m and for each resource j there is a capacity constraint, s¯j . Further, we consider an economy where
each agent is endowed with a budget through a means such as electronic coupons that they can spend over
a time horizon of a day over which they can use these public spaces. Each of the public spaces belong to one
of a set of T different resource types, such as grocery stores, parks, beaches etc., and an individual would
not want to go to more than one of the public spaces within the same type over the time horizon. Person i’s
valuation for a public space j is given by uij as defined earlier and each individual would like to maximize
their utility subject to the budget and the above mentioned physical constraint, which gives the optimization
problem (3a)-(3d). We note that in the absence of this physical constraint, if we used the pure Fisher market
framework then an individual could have received a highly undesirable allocation. For instance, the pure
Fisher market framework without these physical constraints may allocate a certain agent to only grocery
stores, based on the fact that the agent had the highest utilities for grocery stores as compared to other
public resources. However, it is certainly not desirable for them to only be allocated to grocery stores and no
other public resources. Our mechanism overcomes this problem by accounting for these necessary physical
constraints whilst guaranteeing a socially beneficial allocation.
1.4.2 Allocating People Time of Use Permits
The method described in the previous section to allocate people to different types of public spaces is also
generalizable to the situation of allocating people time slots to use a given public space. We consider a
specific example of allocating time of use permits to people to use a beach. We consider a time horizon of
a week and for each day we consider four time slots, which results in a total of twenty-eight time slots (i.e.
m = 28) during which people can use the beach. To restrict the total number of people that can use the
beach at any point in time, each time slot j has an associated capacity s¯j . The time slots on any given
day belong to the same resource type, with no agent wanting to use the beach more than once on a given
day. Furthermore, each agent i has their list of preferred days Ti that they would wish to use the beach,
and their valuation for time slot j is denoted by a utility uij . Based on these constraints and information
on the utilities of the customers, our mechanism will set prices such that customers will purchase permits
in a controlled manner, thereby leading to an outcome that resembles the original capacity restrictions for
the beach. Employing time of use permits that are priced according to our mechanism will help achieve an
intermediate between the two extremes of an overused and an underused beach presented in Figure 1. We
depict such an intermediate market outcome in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Our market outcome that will achieve an intermediate between an overcrowded and an underused beach.
Through our pricing mechanism, customers will purchase time of use permits (in this case at 3 hour intervals) in a
controlled manner resulting in neither overcrowded or underused public resources.
1.4.3 Implementation
The implementation of the generalized Fisher market mechanism proposed in this work requires a specifica-
tion of the data that needs to be inputted into the mechanism, such as budgets, utilities, and constraints, as
well as the monitoring and enforcement of such a mechanism. To elucidate the details of the implementation
of this mechanism, let us again consider allocating time slots to a specific public space, such as a beach.
As a first step, we will need to create blocks of times of usage for the beach and potentially impose
constraints on the sections of the population that can use the public space at any point in time, e.g., having
dedicated times for only elderly use. Next, as we consider artificial currencies, the budgets of individuals can
be allocated through electronic means in the form of coupons. These artificial currencies/electronic coupons
can then be used by the people to buy priced time-of-use permits to use the beach. People will buy those
permits that yield the highest utilities subject to their budget and other physical constraints. However,
in order to set appropriate prices, the market mechanism needs to learn information on the utilities and
constraints of buyers over time such that it can achieve a market clearing outcome.
To learn such information of consumers in the economy, we classify people into different groups based on
parameters such as their income level and demographic information. The premise behind classifying people
into groups is so that we can assign all members within a group the same utility/constraint coefficients,
which helps in reducing the computational complexity of the problem. Within each demographic type,
these utility/constraint coefficients can be learned from the past “buying-behavior” of these individuals. For
instance, in the first few weeks of the roll out of the mechanism (with prices set based on prior knowledge
of customer behavior), we can observe the number of people using the beach at different times of the day
based on their demographic backgrounds. As we observe the “buying-behavior” of these different groups
of individuals over time, we can iteratively update our prior on the utility/constraint coefficients of each
demographic group and use this to set updated prices. Through this adaptive learning process, we will
be able to set appropriate prices (evaluated through the dual variables of our proposed Fisher market
mechanism) and achieve the desired market clearing outcome. Finally, on the enforcement front, either a
park rangers can be present to randomly check the permits of the people or a booth can be placed at the
entrance of the beach that checks people’s permits.
1.5 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a motivation for why certain mod-
ifications are necessary to the Fisher market framework to guarantee market clearing properties with the
addition of physical constraints. We then propose a new budget perturbed social optimization problem in
section 3 that guarantees a market clearing outcome whilst maintaining the properties of the allocations of
the unperturbed social optimization problem. As the budget perturbed problem involves setting the pertur-
bation constants as the dual variables of the added constraints, we present a fixed point iterative procedure
to compute these constants in section 4. Here, we also present theoretical and numerical justifications for
the convergence of the iterative scheme to a unique fixed point. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 5.
2 Generalizing Fisher Markets to account for Additional Con-
straints?
A desirable property of a Fisher market is that the market equilibrium outcome maximizes a social objective
while individuals receive their most favoured bundle of goods given the set prices. As this property of Fisher
markets holds when we consider budget and capacity constraints, a natural question to ask is whether we
can still achieve this property under the addition of the physical constraints (3c) that are not present in
the original Fisher market formulation. We now show that the addition of these constraints and under no
further modifications to the Fisher market framework, market clearing conditions fail to hold. To do this
we first define the social optimization problem (SOP1) with additional constraints in section 2.1 and then
compare the KKT conditions of the two problems (IOP and SOP1) to establish that a market clearing
outcome does not hold in section 2.2.
2.1 Defining the Social Optimization Problem
As a first step towards establishing that market clearing conditions do not hold, we define the natural
extension of the Fisher market social optimization problem (2a)-(2c) presented earlier with the addition of the
physical constraints (3c). We note that barring the additional constraints, the following social optimization
problem (SOP1) formulation (4a)-(4d) is identical to the original Fisher market social optimization problem.
max
xi,∀i ∈ [n]
u(x1, ...,xn) =
∑
i
wi log
∑
j
uijxij
 (4a)
s.t.
∑
i
xij = s¯j ,∀j ∈ [m] (4b)
ATt xi ≤ 1,∀t ∈ Ti,∀i ∈ [n] (4c)
xij ≥ 0,∀i, j (4d)
2.2 A KKT Comparison of IOP and SOP1
In the original Fisher Market formulation, a market clearing outcome, i.e. when all the budgets are exhausted
and all goods are sold up to capacity, was guaranteed to exist when the KKT conditions of the individual
and social optimization problems were equivalent [5]. We follow a similar approach when considering the
social and individual optimization problems with additional constraints (IOP and SOP1) and show that
these problems are not KKT equivalent and thus market clearing conditions fail to exist by establishing the
following result.
Theorem 1. The market clearing KKT conditions of IOP and SOP1 are not equivalent.
The proof of this claim is presented in the Appendix section 6.1. This result establishes that the prices
a social planner would set through the solution of SOP1 does not guarantee a market clearing outcome,
as there would be agents with unused budgets and goods for which some units would be left unsold. The
result further highlights that a naive implementation of the Fisher market framework fails to generalize to
the addition of constraints. This brings us to the question of whether we can still leverage Fisher markets
to set appropriate prices for public good allocation problems.
We answer this question in the rest of this paper through a modification to the original Fisher market
framework that will enable us to set appropriate market clearing prices under the addition of these physical
constraints.
3 Using Fisher Markets to Guarantee a Market Clearing Outcome
The results of the previous section suggest that certain modifications are necessary to the Fisher market
framework to allocate goods in the addition of physical constraints. When considering such modifications,
it is unclear what potential perturbations one could make to either IOP or SOP1 to guarantee a market
clearing outcome. Next, even if some modification to the problem guaranteed that the market clears, it
is unclear how the solution to this perturbed problem relates to the solution of the original problem. In
particular, can we guarantee that our modified problem is a true reflection of the original objectives and
constraints of society and its agents?
We address these concerns by first defining a new social optimization problem (BP-SOP) in section 3.1
in which we perturb the budgets of the agents. Then, in section 3.2, we show how to choose these budget
perturbations to guarantee the equivalence of its KKT conditions with that of the IOP to establish a market
clearing guarantee. Finally, we show in section 3.3 that the solution obtained by our budget perturbed
formulation maintains the solution of the original model up to utilities of the agents, i.e. the utilities of
the agents are invariant to the value of the budget perturbation, thereby accurately reflecting the original
societal objective.
3.1 A Reformulation of the Social Optimization Problem
We now present a reformulated social optimization problem in which we modify the budget of agents through
a variable λi for each agent i. This variable can be thought of as a perturbation in the budget of the agents
and is introduced because of the additional physical constraints that are not present in the original Fisher
market problem. We then derive the value that λi should take so that the the market clears, which is
explained in more detail in the KKT analysis in section 3.2. The Budget Perturbed Social Optimization
Problem (BP-SOP) is represented as:
max
xi,∀i ∈ [n]
u(x1, ...,xn) =
∑
i
(wi + λi) log
∑
j
uijxij
 (5a)
s.t.
∑
i
xij = s¯j ,∀j (5b)
ATt xi ≤ 1,∀t ∈ T˜ ,∀i ∈ [n] (5c)
xij ≥ 0,∀i, j (5d)
where the first constraint (5b) is the market clearing constraint where s¯j is the capacity of good j. We also
have the physical constraint (5c) and the non-negativity constraint (5d) as in the individual optimization
problem.
While the choice of the budget perturbation constants is made to set prices appropriately to achieve a
market clearing outcome, these constants modify the objective function, which leads to the maximization
of a quantity that may not be related to the unperturbed social objective in SOP1. However, we show in
section 3.3 that the resulting allocations in the presence of these budget perturbation constants will still
guarantee that agents receive the same utilities as in the absence of these constants. Thus, the sole effect of
these perturbation constants is to ensure that prices are set at the right level in the market.
3.2 Verification of KKT Conditions
We now show the equivalence of the KKT conditions of BP-SOP and IOP, which establishes that solv-
ing the budget perturbed social optimization problem is equivalent to solving the reformulated individual
optimization problem with the additional physical constraints. More precisely, we prove the following:
Theorem 2. The KKT conditions of BP-SOP are equivalent to that of the IOP if for each agent i,
the budget perturbation constant λi =
∑
t rit, where rit is the dual variable associated with the allocation
constraint associated with agent i for good type t.
The derivation of the KKT conditions of the individual and social optimization problems are presented
in Appendix section 6.2.1. We use these to prove our theorem in the analysis that follows.
Proof. To establish this claim, we first note that the constraints of the social optimization problem already
implies that the goods are sold to capacity, and the constraints also imply the IOP constraints (3c) and (3d).
Next, we use the notation and equations in appendix section 6.2.1 and the corresponding KKT conditions
of BP-SOP and IOP.
If we divide (13) and (14) by wi+λi∑
j uijxij
, then these equations map respectively to the Lagrangian derivative
equation (16) and complimentary slackness equation (17) of the individual optimization problem. We show
this by denoting p ∈ Rm as the dual variable for the capacity constraint, i.e., pj is the dual variable
corresponding to the capacity constraint for good j, and then we have that (13) becomes:
uij −
∑
j uijxij
wi + λi
pj −
∑
t
∑
j uijxij
wi + λi
ritAtj ≤ 0 (6)
The above equation is equivalent to (16), where yi =
∑
j uijxij
wi+λi
≥ 0, r˜it =
∑
j uijxij
wi+λi
rit ≥ 0. The same analysis
holds for the complementary slackness condition equivalence in the two problems.
Now, all it remains for us to satisfy is the IOP constraint (3b). To do this, we use the complementary
slackness condition in equation (14) and sum over j. Then realizing that rit
∑
j Atjxij = rit by complimentary
slackness we get:
wi + λi −
∑
j
pjxij −
∑
t
rit = 0 (7)
Thus, if we set λi =
∑
t rit as in the statement of the theorem, we obtain that the budget constraint
condition (3b) is satisfied with equality. This implies that we have a market clearing outcome, as the budgets
are completely used and the goods are sold to capacity, while the KKT conditions of the two problems are
the same.
The above result implies that the prices a social planner would set through the solution of BP-SOP
would guarantee a market clearing outcome. However, we note that for this mechanism to be implementable
we need to determine the exact budget perturbation parameters which depend on the dual variables of
the capacity constraint in problem BP-SOP, which we do not have knowledge of. This issue is addressed
through a fixed point iterative procedure to determine these perturbation constants in section 4.
3.3 Applicability of the Solution of BP-SOP
Having established the equivalence between the budget perturbed social optimization problem (BP-SOP)
and the individual optimization problem (IOP), we now establish the connection between the resulting
allocations under the appropriately chosen budget perturbation constants and the solution to the naive
implementation of the the social optimization problem (SOP1). The purpose of the following analysis is to
show that the addition of the budget perturbation constants is solely to guarantee that we have a market
clearing outcome (established in section 3.2) and does not alter the resulting allocations significantly. In
particular, we show that the utilities that agents derive from the optimal allocations of SOP1 and BP-SOP
are exactly the same. This establishes that the budget perturbation constants do not influence the utilities
of the agents while ensuring a market clearing outcome when the constants are chosen appropriately as
discussed in section 3.2.
To prove our claim, we establish a more general result, wherein we show that under any two feasible
instantiations of BP-SOP, i.e., when BP-SOP is solved with two different non-negative budget perturbation
constants λ ∈ Rn≥0 and λ′ ∈ Rn≥0, then the utilities of the agents remains the same. We note that SOP1 is
a specific instance of BP-SOP when perturbations are λ = 0 ∈ Rn≥0.
For our analysis, we let xi ∈ Rn represent the optimal allocation to agent i under the λ initialization
and x′i ∈ Rn represent the optimal allocation to agent i under the λ′ initialization. With this notation, we
now prove the following claim:
Theorem 3. For any choice of λ ∈ Rn≥0, the utilities of each agent remains the same under both allocations
xi or x
′
i, where x
′
i is the allocation corresponding to a λ
′ ∈ Rn≥0 initialization.
To establish this result, we first show that the objective function of BP-SOP is unchanged under the λ
initialization for either the allocation xi or x
′
i, indicating that both these allocations are optimal. This claim
is proven in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let λ ∈ Rn≥0 be the chosen perturbations in an instance of BP-SOP, then the value of the
objective function of BP-SOP will remain the same under either the allocation xi or x
′
i, where x
′
i is the
allocation corresponding to a λ′ ∈ Rn≥0 initialization.
Proof. Suppose, we consider an instance of BP-SOP with λ and another such instance with λ′. We first
note that any feasible allocation in the λ iteration is also feasible in the λ′ iteration and vice versa, as the
constraints sets for the two problems are identical. Next, suppose that xi represents the optimal allocation
to agent i under the λ instance and x′i represents the optimal allocation to agent i under the λ
′ instance.
Then we have from the optimality of xi for the λ instance that:∑
i
(wi + λi) log(u
T
i xi) ≥
∑
i
(wi + λi) log(u
T
i x
′
i)
Next, we observe that we have a weighted sum of the log utilities, wherein the weighted sum on the left hand
side weakly dominates the weighted sum on the right hand side. Thus, if we apply a different non-negative
weighting factor, i.e. wi + λ
′
i (which is guaranteed to be non-negative as the wi ≥ 0 and λ′i ∈ Rn≥0) then the
same relationship continues to hold, i.e.:∑
i
(wi + λ
′
i) log(u
T
i x
′
i) ≤
∑
i
(wi + λ
′
i) log(u
T
i xi)
But from the optimality of x′i for the λ
′ instance we have that:∑
i
(wi + λ
′
i) log(u
T
i x
′
i) ≥
∑
i
(wi + λ
′
i) log(u
T
i xi)
These inequalities imply that the above terms must hold with equality, which establishes that the optimal
solution to the problem is invariant to the choice of λ. In particular, the above arguments can also be made
for λ instantiation. Thus we have shown that that the objective function for λ ∈ Rn≥0 remains the same
under either the allocation xi or x
′
i, i.e.:∑
i
(wi + λi) log(u
T
i xi) =
∑
i
(wi + λi) log(u
T
i x
′
i)
Hence, we have proven our claim.
The above lemma implies the following corollary which will imply our theorem:
Corollary 1. For distinct λ and λ′, the utility of each agent is the same under allocation xi or x′i.
Proof. We have seen that both xi and x
′
i ∀i are feasible and lead to the same objective function value for
both the λ and λ′ iterations in Lemma 1. To prove this claim, we note that our problem BP-SOP is a
convex optimization problem and the logarithmic function is strictly concave in its argument uTi xi. Now as
both xi and x
′
i ∀i are feasible and lead to the same objective, this can only happen if the argument of the
logarithmic function is unique, i.e., uTi xi = u
T
i x
′
i,∀i. This completes the proof of our claim.
An immediate result of the above corollary is the statement of Theorem 3. Having established this result,
we highlight that the solution to BP-SOP under the appropriately chosen budget perturbation parameters
ensures a market clearing outcome whilst leaving the utilities of all agents in the market unchanged. Thus,
we have designed a mechanism that retains the market clearing properties of the traditional Fisher market
setup while accounting for additional physical constraints.
4 Fixed Point Iterative Scheme to determine λi
In the above budget perturbed social optimization formulation, we required that λi =
∑
t rit, i.e. λi depends
on the dual variables of the problem, which we have no knowledge of apriori. Thus, when solving our problem,
we will not be able to start out with the correct value of λi that satisfies the above expression relating λi to
the dual variables. In this section, we show how to compute the appropriate value of λi through the means
of a fixed point iteration of the form (λ
(k+1)
1 , ..., λ
(k+1)
n ) = G(λ
(k)
1 , ..., λ
(k)
n ) = (
∑
t r
(k)
1t , ...,
∑
t r
(k)
nt ). Here G
is a function that takes in the kth iterate λ
(k)
i for all agents i, solves the corresponding social optimization
problem BP-SOP and returns the dual variables corresponding to the physical constraints.
The following algorithm depicts the fixed point iterative scheme, where, λ = (λ1, ..., λn), rt = (r1t, ..., rnt),
where rit is the dual variable corresponding to the physical constraint for agent i and good type t in BP-SOP
and r = (r1, ..., rm).
A natural question to ask is whether our iterative scheme converges and if so to what value of λi’s
it converges to. In this section, we answer this question by first establishing that the fixed point of our
procedure is unique and that it converges in sections 4.1- 4.2. We then numerically show the convergence
performance through experiments in section 4.3.
Algorithm 1: Fixed Point Scheme
Input : Tolerance , Function G(·) to calculate dual variables of physical constraints of BP-SOP
Output: Budget Perturbation Parameters λ
λ← 0 ;
rt ← G(λ) ;
while ‖λ−∑t rt‖2 >  do
λ←∑t rt ;
r← G(λ)
end
4.1 Uniqueness of Fixed Point
In this section, we show the existence of a unique fixed point of the iterative procedure shown in Algorithm
1. This step will be crucial in showing that the iterative procedure converges in the subsequent section 4.2.
We show uniqueness by establishing the following claim:
Theorem 4 (Uniqueness of Fixed Point). The iterative scheme λ(k+1) = (λ
(k+1)
1 , ..., λ
(k+1)
n ) = G(λ
(k)
1 , ..., λ
(k)
n )
in Algorithm 1 has a unique fixed point, i.e. ∃ a unique λi such that it exactly equals
∑
t rit for all agents i.
To prove this theorem, we require the following intermediate lemma.
Lemma 2. If there exist λ and λ′ that correspond to distinct fixed points of the iterative scheme, then prices
for each public good under both fixed points is the same, i.e. pj = p
′
j for all goods j, at market clearing
conditions.
Lemma 2 states that the prices for each good will remain the same if there existed two distinct fixed
points on the iterative scheme. The proof of this lemma is presented in appendix section 6.3. We also require
the following immediate corollary of Theorem 3:
Corollary 2. If there exist λ and λ′ that correspond to distinct fixed points of the iterative scheme of
Algorithm 1, then the utilities of the agents are the same under allocation xi or x
′
i.
Using Lemma 2 and corollary 2, we can prove theorem 4, which is deferred to appendix section 6.3.
4.2 Convergence of Fixed Point Iterative Scheme
We now leverage the existence of a unique fixed point of the iterative scheme to prove its convergence. Using
Lemma 1 and Corrollary 1, we can establish the following main result of this paper, a proof of which is
deferred to the appendix section 6.4.
Theorem 5 (Convergence). The iterative scheme in Algorithm 1 converges to the unique fixed point.
The above result is independent of the number of agents or the number of goods and thus the convergence
guarantee is invariant to the size or complexity of the problem instance in a specific application. As a result,
this iterative procedure can be implemented for problem instances that are of practical interest, such as the
allocation of agents to different public spaces in a city to avoid overuse of particular resources at certain
points in time. We show the applicability of our iterative procedure to assign agents to such shared resources
through computational experiments and validate our theoretical convergence guarantee in the next section.
4.3 Numerical Experiments with Iterative Scheme
To numerically evaluate the convergence of the iterative scheme for BP-SOP, we implemented Algorithm
1 on problem instances arising in different applications. In this section, we explain our numerical results
through the application of our iterative procedure to the allocation of time slots to agents to use public
spaces, such as a beach.
4.3.1 An Application to Public Space Allocation
We consider a neighborhood with three different types of public spaces, including grocery stores, parks, and
beaches. Within each type of goods, there are two different public spaces, i.e., there are two grocery stores,
parks and beaches each. In the neighborhood, we consider a population of 200 people and capacities of
100 people for each of these public goods. The people have different values for the different public spaces,
and their preferences are captured through their utilities for availing each of these public spaces, which can
depend on a range of factors including their proximity to the public space and quality of service of a given
public space within a certain type relative to other public spaces within the same type. For the purposes of
this analysis, the utilities are randomly generated. Each agent is endowed with random budgets (although
these could be assigned in any manner including giving each person equal budgets) and no person would
like to avail more than one unit of each type of public space, which represents the physical constraint in our
model.
To evaluate the convergence performance of our model on this problem instance (as well as other problem
instances), we set the convergence criteria for the iterative scheme as:
∥∥∥λ(k) −∑t r(k)t ∥∥∥ ≤ , as in Algorithm
1. Here, λ(k) = (λ
(k)
1 , ..., λ
(k)
n ) and r
(k)
t = (r
(k)
1t , ..., r
(k)
nt ), where r
(k)
it is the dual variable of the optimization
problem at iteration k, and n is the total number of people in the economy, which is 200 for our problem
instance. More generally, the experiment confirmed that for the above public goods allocation problem
(as well as for other problem instances) a unique fixed point exists and depending on the initialization of
the perturbation parameters λ, monotonic convergence was observed. In particular, if the λ values were
randomly initialized to below the fixed point then a monotonic increase in the λ values was observed until
convergence and if λ values were randomly initialized to a point greater than the fixed point solution then
a monotonic decrease in the λ values was observed. Furthermore, when looking at the allocations for the
public space allocation problem, we note that the numerical experiments confirmed the feasibility of the
allocations with each good being used to capacity. In particular, for each agent the sum of their allocations
within each resource type, i.e., grocery stores, parks and beaches, is exactly one, indicating feasibility with
respect to the added physical constraints.
We further note that we did not require any structure on the budgets and utilities when performing our
experiments and observed a convergence of the iterative scheme. In particular, even if the utilities or budgets
are randomly chosen as is the case in our public goods allocation example, we obtain that the difference in
the norm of the λ and the corresponding dual variables decreases with the number of iterations as can be
observed in Figure 3. As a result, our numerical experiments indicate that the convergence of the procedure
is independent of the data, such as utilities or budgets of the agents in our model. The numerical study also
showed that the dual variables settled near the same values irrespective of the problem initialization further
indicating the existence of a unique fixed point.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we have developed market based mechanisms to more efficiently allocate capacity constrained
public goods that are priced in non-monetary units. We showed the market clearing properties of our
proposed mechanism in the instance when agents have budget and other physical constraints, thereby gener-
alizing the Fisher market framework. In particular, we reformulated the Fisher market setup to account for
additional physical constraints by perturbing the budgets of agents and defining a new social optimization
problem BP-SOP. We then showed the equivalence between the social optimization problem BP-SOP and
the individual optimization problem IOP through the verification of the KKT conditions of the two prob-
lems. Next, we established that the utilities of the agents corresponding to the resulting allocations from
the solution of our perturbed problem BP-SOP is invariant to the choice of the perturbation constants.
This establishes that our newly defined objective in BP-SOP is an accurate reflection of the original social
objective considered in Fisher markets. To obtain the right budget perturbation parameters, we finally used
a fixed point iteration scheme for the reformulated social optimization problem and proved the convergence
of our iterative scheme to a unique fixed point for this problem. Our numerical results for the budget per-
turbed problem corroborate our theoretical convergence results and further indicate that the convergence is
invariant to perturbations in the budgets and utilities of agents.
Figure 3: Numerical Convergence of fixed point iterative scheme with 200 people, 6 goods and 3 types of goods.
The budgets and utilities were assigned randomly, and the convergence is observed after about 40 iterations.
There are various interesting directions of future research that warrant more study. First, the allocations
provided by our market mechanism are fractional, and as we would like to make discrete allocations, it
would be interesting to investigate the loss in social efficiency under integral constraints on the decision
variables. Furthermore, while we have established the convergence of our iterative scheme to a unique fixed
point in this work and have numerically shown convergence guarantees, it would be beneficial to theoretically
understand the rate of convergence of our procedure. Next, we believe that a stronger characterization of the
computational complexity of this problem would provide a more nuanced appreciation of whether computing
the exact fixed point is feasible in polynomial time. Finally, an interesting area of research is generalizing this
framework to an online setting in which customers use the market platform one at a time and an irrevocable
decision needs to be made about the prices that should be set in the market while still achieving a socially
efficient allocation.
6 APPENDIX
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
To prove theorem 1 we need to compare the KKT conditions of individual and social optimization problems.
We only derive the KKT conditions of the social optimization problem SOP1 and show that the budgets of
agents will in general not be completely used up and thus a market clearing equilibrium cannot hold.
6.1.1 KKT conditions of Social Optimization Problem SOP1
We now derive the KKT conditions for SOP1. To do so, we introduce the dual variables p ≥ 0 for (4b), rit ≥
0 ∀t and ∀i for each of the constraints in (4c) and sij ≤ 0,∀j for each of the non-negativity constraints (4d).
Next, we derive the Lagrangian of this problem as:
L =
∑
i
wi log
∑
j
uijxij
−∑
j
pj
(∑
i
xij − s¯j
)
−
∑
i
∑
t
rit
∑
j
Atjxij − 1
−∑
i
∑
j
sijxij (8)
The first order KKT condition is found by taking the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to xij :
wi∑
j uijxij
uij − pj −
∑
t
ritAtj ≤ 0 (9)
Next, the complimentary slackness condition for this problem can be derived by multiplying (9) by xij :
wi∑
j uijxij
uijxij − pjxij −
∑
t
ritAtjxij = 0 (10)
Thus, the KKT conditions of the social optimization problem are given by equations (4b)-(4d), (9), (10) and
the sign constraints of the dual variables.
6.1.2 Establishing Theorem 1
We now use the above derivations of the KKT conditions to complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. We observe that at the market clearing outcome, it must be that all of the budgets must be entirely
used up. We now show that this will in general not be true. To see this, consider the KKT condition in
equation (10) of the social optimization problem. If we sum over j, we observe that this equation can be
expressed as:
wi −
∑
j
pjxij −
∑
t
rit = 0 (11)
However, the above constraint implies that the only way wi =
∑
j pjxij is if
∑
t rit = 0, which implies that
rit = 0 ∀i, t, as each rit ≥ 0. However, this in general cannot be expected, as at the market clearing outcome
the physical constraint (4c) is met with equality. In particular, if rit = 0 ∀i, t implies that if we loosen any
of the physical constraints then the objective function value will remain unchanged. However, if there is a
difference between agent’s utilities between goods then for the type of goods for which the physical constraint
is loosened at least one person will be better off as they have higher utilities and so the objective function
must increase. As a result, in general the scenario rit = 0 ∀i, t is not possible. Thus, we have that the market
clearing KKT conditions of the social and individual optimization problems are not necessarily the same,
proving our claim.
6.2 KKT conditions Required for Proof of Theorem 2
We now derive the KKT conditions for the budget perturbed social optimization problem BP-SOP and
individual optimization problem IOP that are used in the derivation of Theorem 2.
6.2.1 Derivation of KKT Conditions for Social Optimization Problem BP-SOP
To establish the equivalence between individual optimization problem (3a)-(3d) and the perturbed social
optimization problem BP-SOP, we start by deriving the KKT conditions for the problem (5a)-(5d). To
do so, we introduce the dual variables p ≥ 0 for (5b), rit ≥ 0,∀t for each of the constraints in (5c) and
sij ≤ 0,∀j for each of the non-negativity constraints (5d). Next, we derive the Lagrangian of this problem
as:
L =
∑
i
(wi + λi) log
∑
j
uijxij
−∑
j
pj
(∑
i
xij − s¯j
)
−
∑
i
∑
t
rit
∑
j
Atjxij − 1
−∑
i
∑
j
sijxij
(12)
The first order KKT condition is found by taking the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to xij :
wi + λi∑
j uijxij
uij − pj −
∑
t
ritAtj ≤ 0 (13)
Next, the complimentary slackness condition for this problem can be derived by multiplying (13) by xij :
wi + λi∑
j uijxij
uijxij − pjxij −
∑
t
ritAtjxij = 0 (14)
Thus, the KKT conditions of the social optimization problem BP-SOP are given by equations (5a)-
(5d), (13), (14) and the sign constraints of the dual variables.
6.2.2 KKT conditions of Individual Optimization Problem IOP
We now derive the KKT conditions of IOP by formulating a Lagrangian and introducing the dual variable
yi ≥ 0 for (3b), r˜it ≥ 0,∀t for each of the constraints in (3c) and s˜ij ≤ 0,∀j for each of the non-negativity
constraints (3d). Thus, our Lagrangian is:
L(xi, yi, ri, s) =
∑
j
uijxij − yi
∑
j
pjxij − wi
−∑
t
r˜it
∑
j
Atjxij − 1
−∑
j
s˜ijxij (15)
The first order constraint for this problem is found by taking the derivative of our Lagrangian with respect
to xij and noting that s˜ij ≤ 0:
uij − yipj −
∑
t
r˜itAtj ≤ 0 (16)
Next, we derive the complimentary slackness condition for this problem by multiplying (16) by xij :
uijxij − yipjxij −
∑
t
r˜itAtjxij = 0 (17)
Thus, the final KKT conditions for our problem are given by equations (3b), (3c), (3d), (16) and (17), and
the sign constraints on the dual variables. Furthermore, as we are in the setting of a Fisher market, we have
an additional constraint that the goods must be sold to capacity, which is given by:
∑
i xij = s¯j ,∀j.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 4
To prove the uniqueness of the fixed point, we first establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If there exist λ and λ′ that correspond to distinct fixed points of the iterative scheme, then prices
for each public good under both fixed points is the same, i.e. pj = p
′
j for all goods j, at market clearing
conditions.
Proof. We denote the dual variables for the market clearing constraint for the λ iteration as pj and that of
the λ′ iteration as p′j ∀j. We can then substitute λi =
∑
t rit and λ
′
i =
∑
t r
′
it ∀i in equation (14) and sum
over i to get: ∑
j
pj s¯j = p
T s¯ =
∑
i
wi = p
′T s¯ =
∑
j
p′j s¯j
We then let the allocations in the λ iteration be denoted by xij and the allocations in the λ
′ iteration be
denoted by x′ij . Then, by the market clearing property we have that
∑
i xij = s¯j ∀j when the prices were
set to pj and we also have that
∑
i x
′
ij = s¯j ∀j when the prices were set to p′j . Now we claim that since∑
j pj s¯j =
∑
j p
′
j s¯j , we must have that ∀j, pj = p′j . To see this, suppose for contradiction that there exists
a k such that pk < p
′
k. Now, as
∑
j pj s¯j =
∑
j p
′
j s¯j , ∃l, such that pl > p′l.
To analyse this further, we consider the tatonnement auction process from [18] in which we keep raising
prices to get a sense of the demand of consumers at the different price levels. So consider the effect of raising
prices from pk to p
′
k. We must have that s¯k =
∑
i x
′
ik ≤
∑
i xik = s¯k, as fewer people can afford the good at
a higher price. In particular since for all i, pTxi = wi, if the price for one good k is raised then the person
can afford only less of that good and so to maximize their utility uTi xi, they will want to purchase more of a
good that has a lower price. However, this implies that the good l with a lower price p′l now has “too much”
demand and so the price is not set appropriately for that good, and thus must be raised for the market to
clear. This contradicts the fact that we have a market clearing solution and so certainly such a λ′ cannot
lead to an equivalence between the social optimization and the individual optimization problems. Thus, we
have a contradiction to the claim that some of the prices could be different for these distinct fixed points
and have established for all j that pj = p
′
j .
Now, we restate and proceed to prove Theorem 4 to establish the uniqueness of the fixed point.
Theorem 4 (Uniqueness of Fixed Point). The iterative scheme λ(k+1) = (λ
(k+1)
1 , ..., λ
(k+1)
n ) = G(λ
(k)
1 , ..., λ
(k)
n )
in Algorithm 1 has a unique fixed point, i.e. ∃ a unique λi such that it exactly equals
∑
t rit for all agents i.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction and assume that both λ and λ′ are fixed points of the iterative scheme.
Then ∃i, such that λi 6= λ′i. Furthermore, from the previous two lemmas we have that for the two fixed
points, it must be that uTi xi = u
T
i x
′
i.
Next, rearranging the KKT condition from equation (13) (and adding back the dual varaibles for the
non-negativity constraints to obtain equality), we must have that ∀i, j the following relationship must hold:
(wi + λi)uij
pj + sij +
∑
t ritAtj
= uTi xi = u
T
i x
′
i =
(wi + λ
′
i)uij
p′j + s
′
ij +
∑
t r
′
itAtj
(18)
Now, consider a xij , such that xij 6= 0, then we must have that s′ij = sij = 0 from the complimentary
slackness condition. As a result, we have the following relationship:
(wi + λi)
pj +
∑
t ritAtj
=
(wi + λ
′
i)
p′j +
∑
t r
′
itAtj
(19)
Since the above relation holds for all j and as for any given j, Atj = 1 for only one value of t (denoted as
tj), we obtain that (19) can be further reduced to:
(wi + λi)
pj + ritj
=
(wi + λ
′
i)
p′j + r
′
itj
(20)
Furthermore, we know that each person must be (fractionally) assigned to at least one good in each type,
as if this were not true then the market would certainly not clear. Thus, for each time period there exists a
route k, such that xik 6= 0. So, using that uTi xi = uTi x′i and that equation (18) holds for all j we have that:
(wi + λi)
pk + ritk
=
(wi + λi)
pj + ritj
=
(wi + λ
′
i)
p′j + r
′
itj
=
(wi + λ
′
i)
p′k + r
′
itk
(21)
This implies that: pk + ritk = pj + ritj and that p
′
j + r
′
itj
= p′k + r
′
itk
. This system of equations implies that
ritj − ritk = r′itj − r′itk for all values of j and k, as pl = p′l ∀l. This implies that the value ritj is just a shifted
constant c from r′itj for all values of j, i.e. r
′
itj
+ c = ritj ∀j. Using that λi =
∑
t rit =
∑
t r
′
it + Tc, we have
that:
(wi + λi)
pj + ritj
=
(wi + λ
′
i + Tc)
pj + r′itj + c
=
(wi + λ
′
i)
p′j + r
′
itj
(22)
We now observe that we have added the same constant to the denominator for all j while the numerator
remains the same for all j in the middle expression of equation (22). So the left two terms of equation (21)
can only be the same if we have that the prices pk and pj are the same. In particular for all the goods that
each agent is fractionally assigned to the prices are the same. However, this would imply that each agent is
assigned to a good with the same quality of service (as the price for a good is related to the values people
place on goods) in each public goods type irrespective of their relative values. If all the agents are given
the same budgets then there must be some types of goods for which each agent is able to use a good with
a higher quality of service and others when each agent has to use a good with a lower quality of service.
Thus, if for all the goods that each agent is fractionally assigned to the prices are the same, then this would
imply the goods all offer the same quality of services (such as the same travel times on all roads and so each
person would value each road equally). As we have assumed that our goods offer different quality of service,
we have obtained our contradiction and so we have proved our desired claim that the fixed point must be
unique.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 5
We introduce some notation that will be used in our analysis to prove our convergence result. First, we
denote the unique fixed point as λ∗i and the corresponding dual variables as r
∗
it. Next, we let the optimal
allocation at the fixed point as x∗i and the optimal allocation at iteration k for each person as x
(k)
i . We also
refer to the optimal allocation when we perturb our constraints at the fixed point as x˜∗i and at iteration k
as x˜
(k)
i . We further note that the initialization of the λ parameters is crucial in establishing the convergence
result. In particular, we must choose a λ that is component-wise greater or smaller then the fixed point λ∗,
as otherwise convergence may not be observed. Thus, we initialize the λ to be either component-wise greater
or smaller then the fixed point λ∗ to ensure convergence. In particular, one can initialize λ to extremely
large values or to 0, as in Algorithm 1, to ensure convergence.
We now restate our convergence result and prove it in the analysis that follows.
Theorem 5 (Convergence). The iterative scheme in Algorithm 1 converges to the unique fixed point.
Proof. To prove our claim, it suffices to show that our sequence of λi’s either monotonically increases or
decreases to λ∗i , i.e. the monotonically increasing sequence of iterates is bounded above by λ
∗
i and the mono-
tonically decreasing sequence of iterates is bounded below by λ∗i for each i. Whether the sequence of iterates
monotonically increases or decreases depends on the initialization of λi at the start of the iterative procedure.
So, without loss of generality, we establish that our sequence of iterates is monotonically decreasing and so
it satisfies the following property: λ∗i ≤ λ(k+1)i ≤ λ(k)i ∀i.
We proceed by induction. For the base case, we can consider initializing the problem such that λi > λ
∗
i
∀i (a symmetric argument would hold if we started with λi < λ∗i ∀i). This establishes the base case, as we
initialize our problem such that the chosen λi’s are all greater than the fixed point. Choosing such a λi is
possible as we have a unique fixed point and so each λ∗i is finite.
Next, suppose that at iteration k we that λ
(k)
i ≥
∑
t r
∗
it. We now hope to establish the same claim at
iteration k + 1 that λ
(k)
i ≥ λ(k+1)i ≥
∑
t r
∗
it. We consider the case that λ
(k+1)
i =
∑
t r
(k)
it 6= λ(k)i , i.e. we are
not at the unique fixed point at iteration k (as if we were then we have already established our claim). Thus,
we have that either λ
(k+1)
i > λ
(k)
i or λ
(k+1)
i < λ
(k)
i .
Consider the case when λ
(k+1)
i > λ
(k)
i ∀i, then, we have by summing over i in (7) that:∑
i
wi −
∑
j
p
(k)
j s¯j =
∑
i
λ
(k+1)
i −
∑
i
λ
(k)
i < 0
This implies that:
∑
j p
(k)
j s¯j <
∑
i wi. This implies that the amount of money that agents spend falls below
their budgets. But this can happen only if there exists a l such that p
(k)
l < p
∗
l .
Since λ∗i < λ
(k)
i ∀i, we must have that:∑
i
(wi + λ
∗
i ) log(u
T
i x
∗
i ) ≤
∑
i
(wi + λ
(k)
i ) log(u
T
i x
∗
i ) =
∑
i
(wi + λ
(k)
i ) log(u
T
i x
(k)
i )
The first inequality follows from the fact that when we increase the value of λ∗i to λ
(k)
i then the original
allocation is still feasible. The equality follows from Lemma 3 above and in particular, from corollary 1 we
have that x
(k)
i = x
∗
i ∀i.
Next, if we loosen the market clearing constraint for good l with λ
(k)
i then the increase in the objective
will be lower than the corresponding change in the objective with λ∗i as p
(k)
l < p
∗
l . More formally, we have
that:
∑
i
[
(wi + λ
∗
i ) log(u
T
i x˜
∗
i )− (wi + λ∗i ) log(uTi x∗i )
]
>
∑
i
[
(wi + λ
(k)
i ) log(u
T
i x˜
(k)
i )− (wi + λ(k)i ) log(uTi x(k)i )
]
Rewriting the above, we have that:
∑
i
(wi + λ
∗
i ) log
(
uTi x˜
∗
i
uTi x
∗
i
)
>
∑
i
(wi + λ
(k)
i ) log
(
uTi x˜
(k)
i
uTi x
(k)
i
)
Now, loosening the capacity constraints, we observe that more agents will only be fractionally allocated to
that good if uil is larger than utility values for other roads. Thus, the change in u
T
i xi must be the same
when we use either λ
(k)
i or λ
∗
i , i.e. u
T
i x
∗
i + ∆ = u
T
i x˜
∗
i and u
T
i x
(k)
i + ∆ = u
T
i x˜
(k)
i for some ∆. From the above
and using that x
(k)
i = x
∗
i ∀i (by corollary 1), we get that:∑
i
(wi + λ
∗
i ) log
(
1 +
∆
uTi x
∗
i
)
>
∑
i
(wi + λ
(k)
i ) log
(
1 +
∆
uTi x
∗
i
)
However, the above expression clearly cannot be true, as λ∗i < λ
(k)
i ,∀i. As a result, we have a contradiction to
the above claim and so we cannot have that λ
(k+1)
i > λ
(k)
i . As a result, we must have that λ
(k+1)
i ≤ λ(k)i ,∀i,
which proves the right inequality of the monotone convergence claim.
To prove the left inequality, all it remains to show is that for larger values of λi, we must have larger
values of the dual variables
∑
t rit. Using an almost identical argument (now instead loosening the physical
constraints) as the above we can establish this claim, which allows us to show that:
λ∗i =
∑
t
r∗it <
∑
t
r
(k+1)
it < λ
(k+1)
i
This establishes our result that the iterative scheme converges. In fact the convergence must occur at
the unique fixed point, as if convergence took place at some point other than λ∗i , then this would violate
uniqueness. Thus, we have proved our claim.
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